The Return Question: Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Politics of Reciprocal Demands
The renewed argument over displaced people is not only about history. It is becoming a test of whether Armenia and Azerbaijan can build peace without turning each community’s trauma into a new claim against the other.
The dispute over “Western Azerbaijan” and the return of Karabakh Armenians has reopened one of the most emotionally difficult questions in the South Caucasus: what happens when historical displacement becomes part of present-day diplomacy? Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has argued that calls to continue the Karabakh movement invite a reciprocal reaction from Baku. His position centres on the danger of escalatory rhetoric (սրող հռետորաբանություն [srogh hretorabanutyun]) that can turn political statements into new sources of fear. Yet the wider issue is also about collective memory (հավաքական հիշողություն [havakakan hishoghutyun]), because both Armenians and Azerbaijanis carry memories of loss, expulsion, war and insecurity that remain deeply personal.
The phrase “Western Azerbaijan” is used by Azerbaijani officials and affiliated organisations to refer to the territory of the present-day Republic of Armenia. Armenian officials and many Armenian commentators reject the term because they see it as a political narrative that can imply territorial or demographic claims. This makes territorial integrity (տարածքային ամբողջականություն [taratsqayin amboghjakanutyun]) central to the debate, since the internationally recognised borders of Armenia are not supposed to become negotiable through public campaigns. At the same time, arguments about historical belonging (պատմական պատկանելիություն [patmakan patkaneliutyun]) are powerful because they appeal to identity and emotion even when they do not create a legal right to alter a state’s borders.
The return of Armenians displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh is a separate but connected issue. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians left the territory after Azerbaijan’s September 2023 military operation, creating one of the largest recent displacement crises in the region. For many displaced families, the right of return (վերադառնալու իրավունք [veradarnalu iravunq]) is not an abstract diplomatic demand but a question about homes, graves, churches, possessions, schools and family history. Any discussion of safe return (անվտանգ վերադարձ [anvtang veradardz]) would require credible guarantees for security, property, education, language, worship and the ability to live without intimidation.
Pashinyan’s government has taken a different approach. It has argued that Armenia must focus on protecting its internationally recognised territory and helping displaced Karabakh Armenians build stable lives inside Armenia. This reflects a strategy of state consolidation (պետական ամրապնդում [petakan amrapndum]), in which national security is tied to a narrower definition of statehood and fewer unresolved territorial aspirations. Critics see this approach as abandoning national representation (ազգային ներկայացուցչություն [azgayin nerkayatsutsichutyun]) for displaced Armenians, especially when they believe that a peace agreement without their rights being addressed would leave a major injustice unresolved.
The political disagreement has become sharper because the Armenian opposition and diaspora organisations do not share the government’s assessment of risk. They argue that pressing for accountability, detainee releases, cultural protection and the return of displaced Armenians does not necessarily undermine peace. Their position rests on human rights advocacy (մարդու իրավունքների պաշտպանություն [mardu iravunqneri pashtpanutyun]) rather than on a claim that Armenia should resume control over Karabakh. The government, by contrast, fears that even symbolic efforts to revive the issue may weaken diplomatic normalisation (դիվանագիտական կարգավորում [divanagitakan kargavorum]) with Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
The core difficulty is that both sides describe their preferred policy as the path to peace. Armenia’s government argues that accepting existing realities, opening communications and reducing territorial language can protect the Armenian state from another war. Many opposition figures argue that peace without justice is unstable because it rewards force and leaves displaced people without legal remedy (իրավական պաշտպանություն [iravakan pashtpanutyun]). The tension between these views reflects a broader question of conflict resolution (հակամարտության կարգավորում [hakamartutyan kargavorum]): should diplomacy first reduce the risk of new violence, or should it first establish guarantees that make a settlement morally and politically sustainable?
Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” campaign makes this question more difficult because it can be read in several ways. Azerbaijani advocates describe it as a call for the peaceful and dignified return of Azerbaijanis who left Armenia during the late Soviet and early post-Soviet violence. Armenian observers often see it as a pressure instrument aimed at weakening Armenian sovereignty (ինքնիշխանություն [inknishkhanutyun]) and creating uncertainty around the country’s demographic future. The absence of a mutually accepted legal framework (իրավական շրջանակ [iravakan shrjakanak]) means that each statement is interpreted through the worst assumptions of the other side.
This is why language matters so much. Words such as “return,” “homeland,” “historic land,” “occupation,” and “settlement” can be used to describe genuine human suffering, but they can also become tools for political mobilisation. Effective confidence-building (վստահության ամրապնդում [vstahutyan amrapndum]) would require both governments to distinguish between humanitarian rights and territorial revisionism. It would also require reciprocity (փոխադարձություն [pokhadardzutyun]) in the sense of applying the same principles to all displaced people, rather than recognising one community’s pain only when it strengthens a political argument.
The unresolved question of detainees further complicates the atmosphere. Armenian advocates continue to call for the release of prisoners and former Karabakh officials held in Azerbaijan, while Azerbaijani authorities have framed many cases through criminal charges connected to the conflict. The need for due process (պատշաճ դատավարություն [patshaj datavarutyun]) is essential because detention and prosecution cannot become substitutes for a broader political settlement. Respect for human dignity (մարդկային արժանապատվություն [mardkayin arjanapatvutyun]) requires transparent procedures, access to legal counsel, family contact and independent monitoring, whatever political disagreements remain.
The international community has an important but limited role. Outside actors can support humanitarian law, facilitate technical dialogue, monitor border incidents and encourage regional transport projects. They cannot decide how Armenians and Azerbaijanis should remember the past or what each society must feel about loss. Their most useful contribution may be international guarantees (միջազգային երաշխիքներ [mijazgayin yerashkhiqner]) that make agreements more credible and less dependent on changing political moods. Long-term regional stability (տարածաշրջանային կայունություն [taratsashrjanayin kayunut’yun]) will depend on whether agreements improve daily security for ordinary people rather than simply producing diplomatic announcements.
Armenia also needs an internal debate that does not force citizens to choose between compassion for displaced Armenians and concern for the security of the Armenian state. These concerns can coexist. A democratic society should allow different views on diplomacy, repatriation, peace negotiations and relations with Azerbaijan without treating disagreement as betrayal. This requires political pluralism (քաղաքական բազմակարծություն [qaghaqakan bazmakartsutyun]) so that opposition voices and diaspora organisations can argue their case openly. It also requires public accountability (հանրային հաշվետվողականություն [hanrayin hashvetvoghakanutyun]) from leaders who must explain the consequences of both action and inaction.
The real danger is not that Armenia and Azerbaijan discuss return, displacement or historical injustice. The danger is that these issues become instruments for creating permanent insecurity rather than pathways to humanitarian solutions. A durable settlement needs room for grief, legal claims, remembrance and human rights without turning each into a threat against the other state. That is the meaning of peacebuilding (խաղաղության կառուցում [khaghaghutyan karutsum]) in a region where trust has been repeatedly destroyed. It also requires coexistence (համակեցություն [hamaketsutyun]), not as a demand that people forget the past, but as a commitment to prevent the past from determining every future decision.
Armenia’s leaders, opposition parties and diaspora groups are all asking different versions of the same question: how can a small state protect itself while remaining faithful to people who have lost homes and security? There is no simple answer. A peace process that ignores displaced people will lack moral legitimacy, but a policy that treats every historical claim as a current territorial demand may make peace impossible. The challenge is to create a political language in which reconciliation (հաշտեցում [hashtetsum]) is not confused with surrender. The longer-term goal must be security through law (օրենքի միջոցով անվտանգություն [orenqi mijotsov anvtangutyun]), where rights, borders and human dignity are protected through institutions rather than through threats.
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